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Abstract- This paper examines the hypothesis that the 
national funding of science is a product of the process of 
governance.  In support of this idea comparative theories 
of national governance are mustered.  A mixed regression 
model is developed which examines the explanatory power 
of economic and political variables in determining science 




The purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis that 
national governance matters in science policy. Governmental 
actors are complex, multi-faceted, and above all constrained 
by institutional choices.  Government policies for science are 
therefore likely to be far from ideal.  Because of this science 
policy requires understanding of governance before advancing 
recommendations for policy.  Governance variables present a 
natural basis for advancing "counterfactuals" about how the 
science system should be run, and how it might be advanced 
in absence of policy advocacy.  
 
A. Two Theories of Policy 
At stake are two different descriptions of governmental 
actors.  The first is the government as an economically rational 
agent.  The second is the government as a political entity with 
pluralistic and competing objectives.  The economically 
rational account of science policy argues that there is a market 
failure in the provision of science.  Science is a public good 
with considerable spill-over across institutional boundaries [1]. 
Since no single private entity can be certain to fully 
appropriate the benefits of scientific research, there will in 
general be an under-investment in science and technology.  It 
is the role of the government to remedy this market failure, 
restoring the national science account by the selection and 
implementation of the correct policies.  The nation then, in 
this theory of science policy, becomes a unitary actor with a 
"production function" of which science funding is a critical 
contributor to national productivity [2].  
Contrast this account with positive political theories of 
government action.  These theories describe the challenge of 
the government as one of capturing and allocating scarce 
resources in society.  There are multiple interests, as well as 
political rivals who have an interest in capturing office [3,4,5]. 
The incentive of governmental officials is rewarding those 
shareholders who are central to the maintenance of 
government. Certain government styles may cause good 
policy to become good politics, but it is far from a foregone 
conclusion.   
If this is the correct account of national science policy 
making, then the institutional features of the government have 
a substantial and perhaps even untoward effect in the 
distributional characteristics of science.  Note that these are 
"positive" theories of government, meaning that although they 
characterize often undesirable behaviors on the part of 
government, these actions are explicable in light of a formal 
theory of actions, interests and incentives.  This paper 
proceeds with a political hypothesis of national science policy 
action as we believe this perspective is under utilized and may 
offer additional and valuable insight.  
 
B. Thesis Statement 
This paper develops a regression model which attempts to 
explain national science policy preferences in light of 
internationally comparable measures of national governance.  
Significant relations between national governance and major 
indicators of science provision are revealed.  These 
relationships persist even when other control variables of 
geography and economy are included.  A substantial 
proportion of variance in national provision of science is 
explained.  This proportion is significant enough to suggest 
that the policy preferences of governments are a lesser effect 
when compared with the procedural processes inherent in 
governance style.   
 
II. THEORIES OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 
 
We find the work of two theorists of comparative politics 
particularly relevant to this research.  Bueno de Mesquita (et 
al) [4] develops a formal and internationally comparable 
analysis of national government.  The authors draw upon both 
democratic and autocratic theories of government to better 
understand the relationship between government policy and 
social welfare.  Too often, Bueno de Mesquita argues, good 
politics results in ineffectual policy.  The authors combine 
formal theory with empirical and historical analysis to defend 
this thesis. As a result they make a vigorous argument that 
democratic enfranchisement is the surest route to improved 
human welfare.  
The purposes of Bueno de Mesquita and co-authors are 
somewhat different than our own.  The authors have two 
policy levers available to a self-serving government: taxation, 
and the provision of public and private goods.  The 
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government uses these levers to preserve power in a political 
system composed of rivals seeking to displace or even depose 
the government.  The authors effectively characterize a broad 
range of national government types using two broad measures. 
The first measure is called the selectorate (S), or the 
proportion of the population empowered to select their leaders.  
This ranges from a diminishingly low proportion, to the 
universal adult suffrage seen in many Western nations.  The 
second variable is called the winset (W), or the proportion of 
the selectorate whose approval must be secured to attain 
power.  In some nations approval from only a small fraction of 
the selectorate is needed, as for instance is the case in military 
juntas or other oligarchic systems.  
The second author of interest to this work is Arend 
Lijphart [3], who adopts an empirical and inductive 
perspective to comparative politics.  Lijphart draws upon 
political theory to identify a broad range of variables believed 
to be of political import.  These variables are then directly 
measured using archival analyses, and subjected to a factor 
analysis procedure to uncover two broad and underlying 
dimensions of governance.  Lijphart focuses on Western 
democracies, as well as on a sampling of central  American 
nations for his analysis.   
Lijphart finds two broad factors suitable for describing 
common patterns of political governance across governments.  
The first factor distinguishes party-based systems from those 
with strong executives.  Party-based systems are typical of 
parliamentary democracies, while strong executives are typical 
of presidencies and the so-called "Westminster" system. The 
second factor contrasts governments which are strongly 
centralized with decentralized or federal systems. 
 Lipjhart relates these revealed variables to economic 
performance as well as to social welfare and political stability.  
The economic performance of nations cannot usefully be 
predicted by either variable.  There are, for instance, no 
meaningful differences between parliamentary and 
presidential systems in terms of long-term economic 
performance.  Lijphart does however find that parliamentary 
systems do meaningfully outperform presidential systems in 
terms of social welfare and political stability. Despite 
Lijphart's caution in not generalizing his results beyond 
largely Western democracies, other researchers argue that his 
findings are evidence of governmental veto-processes at work 
which are widely applicable across governmental types [5].  
Other authors have also attempted "actor-centered 
institutional" approaches to explain the economic policy 
preferences of nations [6].  
Taken together, the works of Bueno de Mesquita and 
Lijphart provide a small set of variables which are useful to 
establishing broadly generalizable features of governance.  
These variables provide a significant insight into how the 
workings of governmental systems lead to desirable or less 
desirable choices of policy.  However, to our knowledge, these 
comparative political theories have yet to be applied to science 
policy. In the following section we subject these theories to 
empirical analysis.  First the data, which combines science 
policy and comparative political indicators, is described.  A 
statistical method for the data is selected and justified.  The 
third section describes the analysis; the fourth provides results 
and the significance of the model.  The fifth and final section 




This section discusses the analysis method.  The section 
begins with a discussion of the data, and follows with a 
rationale for the appropriate analysis. Then the analytical 
details of the selected method are presented.  A confirmatory 
factor analysis, with associated significance tests of 
correlations, is the selected method.  
 
A. Science System Data 
The data set is selected to test the hypothesis, as 
formulated in the previous two sections, that political 
institutions matter in the governance of science policy.  The 
cases used in the study are all OECD nations, plus an extended 
set of high technology nations including Russia and China. 
We use the latest available data as of 2009. The data used in 
this study includes three sets of variables: independent, 
conditional and dependent variables.  We present each of these 





Description Source Availability 
Lijphart's executive vs 
parties dimension 
Lijphart [3] 22 nations 
Lijphart's federal versus 
unitary dimension 
Lijphart 22 nations 




All 38 nations 
Selectorate Variable Bueno de 
Mesquita et 
al. [4,8] 




the high S 
nations 
Winset Variable Bueno de 
Mesquita et 
al. 










Indicator variable for 
Constitutional or 
Monarchy 
CIA All 38 nations 
Indicator variable for 
Federal 
CIA All 38 nations 
Indicator variable for 
Parliamentary 
Democracy 
CIA All 38 nations 
Indicator variable for 
Republican 











Description Source Availability 
Surface area CIA All 38 nations 
Gross domestic product CIA All 38 nations 
Population CIA All 38 nations 







Description Source Availability 
Total expenditure OECD All 38 nations 
Proportion of R&D financed by 
government 
OECD All 38 nations 
Proportion of R&D financed by 
industry 
OECD All 38 nations 
Proportion of R&D conducted by 
government 
OECD All 38 nations 
Proportion of R&D conducted by 
military 
OECD All 38 nations 
Proportion of R&D conducted by 
education 
OECD All 38 nations 
Proportion of R&D conducted by 
industry 
OECD All 38 nations 
Proportion of R&D conducted by 
military 
OECD 10 nations 
Nobel prizes Nobel Foundation 
[11]] 
All 38 nations 
  
All data in the set are scaled appropriately for analysis.  
Proportional variables are transformed using the odds-ratio 
and the logarithm.  Ratio variables are scaled using a 
logarithm.  
 
B. Justification of Method 
The data is appropriately modeled with confirmatory 
factor analysis.  There are a few underlying dimensions which 
are assumed to explain both the inputs as well as the outputs.  
However these underlying dimensions are incompletely 
measured, and subject to multiple partial indicators.  Partial 
political indicators include the multiple theories of 
comparative politics, which while largely congruent, are still 
challenged by direct verification in data. Indeed, part of the 
objectives of this analysis is to identify and make operational 
those significant variables of political study which are relevant 
for science policy. Partial outcome indicators include the 
multiple science provision indicators examined in this study.  
While the selected dimensions in this study are highly salient, 
they do not constitute the complete range of possible science 
provisioning variables which can be explained using these 
constructs.  
An alternative paradigm for modeling this data would be 
the regression analytic technique.  A regression approach is 
partially adopted by including a number of economic 
intermediary variables.  However a full regression analysis of 
output based on both politics and economics is not attempted 
in this study.  As a result we must be cautious about drawing 
conclusions about the statistical conclusions from this study, 
since a mutually satisfactory fit of both input as well as output 
is attempted using factor analysis.  Significance of correlations 
are offered as a diagnostic; the sufficiency of these 
correlations must depend on the adequacy of the theory 
underlying the observed correlations.  
 
C. Technical Description of Method  
Consider the following interlinked set of variables.  
Capital letters are vectors, lower case Greek letters are scalars, 
and script letters are random variables. Subscripts on each of 
the vectors are suspended for brevity. The variable W 
represents the governance variables. The variable X represents 
the economic proxies.  The variable Y represents the science 
provision variables, and Z represents the full set of political 
indicators (equations 1).   
There are two sources of Gaussian noise, N1 and N2.  Link 
functions are used where appropriate for discrete dependent 
variables.  The governance variables are unobserved in the 
data, but estimated from the model. Further, the parameters 












   (1) 
 
The model contains some aspects of factor analysis as well 
as of regression analysis. The model is using maximum 
likelihood estimation; missing data are replaced using an 
expectation maximization procedure.  Note that the model is 
highly parsimonious since only a few hidden governance 
variables are used to explain both the full set of political and 
science provision variables.  In this case two governance 
variables are estimated.  
A model is fit which estimates two hidden variables, 
hypothesized to be related to policy variables.  These policy 
variables serve as best fitting descriptors of a range of 
associated indicators of national governance.  Furthermore 
these policy variables serve as best fitting predictors of 
science policy provision, conditioned on traditional economic 
variables such as land, labor and capital.  Alternative models 
are evaluated using informativeness criteria.  These results are 
not reported here for space, but the model appears robust and 




In this final results section four archetypes of national 
science provision are presented based on the model results 
(see Table IV). No single nation corresponds in the ideal to 
these types; the results are abstracted based on results from 
multiple nations.  The model abstracts away economic, 
population and geographic-level detail to focus on a 
hypothetical average-sized country from each of the four 
policy styles.  
The commensual style of science provision is seemingly 
run by industry and on behalf of industry.  Total science 
funding is highest in this system, and participation in the 
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scientific workforce is also the highest.  Belgium is an 
exemplar of this style.  The federal system, as exemplified by 
France, has a mix of government and industry funding, with 
strong participation by both the industrial system and the 
academic sector.  Conditioned on population and economics, 
nations under a federal system are expected to receive the 
majority of the world's Nobel prizes. The majoritarian system 
is run on behalf a strong executive branch, pursuing military 
or other programmatic objectives.  There are strong national 
R&D laboratories, but total R&D funding has dramatically 
diminished compared to the other styles.  The Polish system 
exemplifies this style. The unitary style is strongly centralized 
in pursuit of governmental objectives.  It incorporates some of 
the stronger aspects of the commensual style with strong R&D 
funding and participation by the governmental sector.  
 
TABLE IV 


























 Belgium France Poland S Korea 
Loading Dimension 1 1 1 -1 -1 
 Dimension 2 1 -1 -1 1 
Expenditure   27,280 7,740 1,710 6,027 
Funding Industrial 83% 44% 27% 70% 
 Governmental 17% 56% 74% 30% 
Participation Industry 78% 40% 24% 66% 
 Education 9% 34% 34% 11% 
 Government  4% 3% 15% 14% 
 Military 1% 7% 10% 2% 




A. Significance Testing 
In this table the results are subjected to significance 
testing.  The correlations between the policy dimensions and 
the independent variables are tested (see Table V), and 
Pearson's r test of significance is applied.  A similar test is 
then applied to the dependent variables (see Table VI). 
 The main political indicators are correlated with one or 
more of the policy dimensions with a significance exceeding 
p=0.01.  The policy dimensions also adequately describe two 
of the four political descriptive labels included in the CIA 
Factbook. A more appropriate parametric test for these 
categorical variables would involve significance tests for a 
logistic model.  These tests are not given here as the most 







CORRELATIONS WITH INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
  Dim 1 Dim 2 
Dim 1 1.00 0.00 
Dim 2 0.00 1.00 
F1 0.33 * 0.68 ** 
F2 0.51 ** -0.57 ** 
Freedom 0.45 ** 0.17 
W 0.77 ** 0.20 
Sci Win 0.72 ** 0.36 ** 
Constitutional Monarchy 0.44 ** 0.10 
Republic -0.12 0.04 
Parliamentary Democracy -0.06 0.08 
Federation 0.38** -0.20 
*  Variable is significant at p < 0.05 
**  Variable is significant at p < 0.01 
 
TABLE VI 
CORRELATIONS WITH DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
  Dim 1 Dim 2 
dim 1  1.00  
dim 2 0.00 1.00 
expend 0.41 ** -0.58 ** 
ind_f 0.46 ** 0.42 ** 
govt_f -0.56 ** -0.40 ** 
ind_p 0.56 ** 0.36 ** 
edu_p -0.15 -0.27 * 
govt_p -0.63 ** -0.25 
mil_p -0.04 0.32 * 
nobel 0.67 ** -0.65 ** 
*  Variable is significant at p < 0.05 
**  Variable is significant at p < 0.01 
 
The main science policy provision indicators are 
correlated with one or more of the policy dimensions with a 
significance exceeding p=0.05.  Educational participation in 
national R&D, and military participation in R&D are at a 
lesser degree of significance.  These results strongly endorse 
the role of dimension two (a measure of policy centralization) 
in creating desirable science provisioning outcomes.  Note that 
it is decentralized governance (a negative loading on this 
variable) which is associated with favorable policy outcomes.  
The situation is more ambiguous with dimension one, a 
measure of executive versus party dominance in science 
policy governance.  Although there are significant 
relationships between  this variable and most of the science 
policy provisioning outcomes, it is not clear from these results 
that there is unambiguously a better style of governance.  
Strong executives have good national laboratories, significant 
military R&D, and strong participation by academia.  Strong 
parties have significant funding, good industrial participation, 
and as seen by the scientific winset have large science and 
technology workforces.   
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B. Comparing Economic and Political Explanations 
In this section we return to the two theories of policy 
presented in the introduction.  Five different regression models 
including various combinations of explanatory variables are 
presented in an effort to distinguish the effects of economics 
from politics in science policy provision (see Table VII). Only 
one of several possible dependent variables is presented -- 
total R&D expenditures. The other regression equations are 
omitted for brevity, as they show similar outcomes.  
The first thing to note about these equations  is the high 
quality of explanation which is provided. A second thing to 
note about these models is the fact that the economic 
explanations explain a greater proportion of the variance than 
the political or policy explanations.  Obscuring the 
relationship is the fact that high population countries in 
general require a higher degree of policy decentralization.  
Thus the economic variables incorporate some of the joint 
geopolitical explanations from which both politics and 
economics are derived. As evidence of this the influence of 
dimension 2 (policy decentralization) switches signs once 
population is included in the model.   
 
TABLE VII 
PREDICTING NATIONAL R&D EXPENDITURES 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 



















-0.37 0.83 8.86 ** 8.84 ** -10.88 ** 
Dim 1 
  0.53 ** 0.50 ** 0.76 ** 
Dim 2 
  -0.75 ** -0.71** 0.63 ** 
population 
0.52 ** 0.46 **    1.14 ** 
GDP 
0.15 ** 0.16 **    -0.00 
land 
-0.06   -0.09    0.06 
USDummy 












*  Variable is significant at p < 0.05 
**  Variable is significant at p < 0.01 
 
A few final comments on the models are provided.  First 
is that there is a U.S. exceptionalism effect, as evidenced by 
the regression dummy.  The United States funds nearly three 
times the research and development one would expect given 
its size.  The effect is somewhat diminished once the political 
variables are incorporated in the model, reflecting the strong 
decentralization of government in the U.S.  A further note is 
the surprising absence of GDP as a determinant of R&D 
funding.  GDP is perhaps the most common benchmark for 
assessing R&D funding adequacy and yet, in this developed 
and developing world sample, it shows no statistical 
relationship with science provisioning.  
 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The concluding section of the paper offers 
recommendations for future research as well as for science 
policy.  The section begins with discussion and commentary 
on the results.  The section focuses on needed new results both 
empirical and conceptual.  
  
A. Recommendations 
In this section the paper turns to recommendations for 
science policy. In particular the section considers the 
consequences of differing governance mechanisms resulting in 
significant differences in national governance of science.  
Given these conclusions, policy recommendations for national 
funding must be more nuanced than spending a fixed 
proportion of national GDP.  In particular, for many nations a 
systematic change in science governance may be needed.  In 
the first section we try to identify those nations with beneficial 
governance systems. In the second we consider specific 
characteristics of the national systems of innovation associated 
with these countries.  Third and finally we consider how 
nations should seek peers if GDP is not an effective measure.  
The data and model presented concerns inputs to the 
science system.  Therefore, we must be cautious in declaring 
that some governance systems provide univerally better 
outcomes than others.  Despite this caution, it does appear that 
most of the desirable inputs to science policy are achieved 
more readily by federal systems of governance.  We therefore 
turn in the following sections to find the most federal systems 
in the sample, and to discover whether their science policy 
outcomes appear more or less federated than their governance 
would otherwise suggest.   
 
B. Governance Mechanisms 
Figure 1 below contrasts Lijphart's federalism variable 
(F2), as directly and empirically measured with the federalism 
results as estimated by this study.  Discrepancies between the 
two may be a measure of noise, or they may reveal nations 
which have systematically attempted to shield their science 
base from an overly centralized system of governance.  The 
F2 variable, both actual and estimated, is plotted in figure 1.  
(Only those nations with a Lijphart score prior to modeling are 
included in the plot.) 
The U.S., Canada and Germany are highly decentralized, 
but have apparently not achieved the full and expected 
benefits of this federalization in their science system.  
Switzerland in particular appears to be scientifically more 
centralized than its national system would imply. France and 
the United Kingdom are moderately centralized countries 
according to Lijphart, but are nonetheless achieving 
significant benefits in their science system despite this degree 
of centralization.  New Zealand appears much more 
decentralized than described by Lijphart, but is still far too 
centralized to fully capitalize on these benefits in the science 
system 
 
Authorized licensed use limited to: Georgia Institute of Technology. Downloaded on January 4, 2010 at 15:00 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
 
Fig.1. Estimates of Federalism 
 
The results of the previous section suggest that we more 
closely examine the science systems of the United States, 
Canada, and Germany, in order to better characterize these 
three decentralized systems of innovation.  New Zealand and 
the United Kingdom stand out as nations which may have 
effectively shielded their science base from an otherwise 
highly centralized governmental apparatus. In particular, we 
are looking for institutional design variables used in these 
countries which shield science funding from the negative 
effects of centralized governance.  Unfortunately this effort 
must be reserved for future work. This work is likely to build 
on results from national innovation systems (c.f. [12]). 
 
B. Conclusions 
In this paper formal models of politics and governance are 
used to explain science provisioning outcomes in an expanded 
selection of OECD nations. Governance variables are 
introduced into an extended linear model using both 
regression and factor analytic elements.  The paper finds a 
very significant role of political and governance variables in 
explaining science policy outcomes.  Contributions are made 
in identifying high performing institutional designs for science 
policy.  Additional contributions are made in recognizing 
appropriate metrics for the comparative benchmarking of 
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